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QUESTIONS  OONCERNING  OERTA.IN  FA  0 IT L 'f I E S 
OLA.IMED  FOR  MA.N. 
[By C. S. PEIDOE.] 
QUESTION 1.  Whether by the  simple con-
templation of a cognition, independently of 
a.ny previous  knowledge and witlwut -reason-
'ing front  signs, we  are  enabled  rightly  to 
jud!IIJ  whether that cognition  has  been de-
twrmined by a previous cognition or whether 
it 1'([j'ers ill/'mediately to its object. 
rrhl'oughout this  paper, the  term  intui-
tion will be taken as signifying a  cognition 
not determined by a  previous  cognition of 
the same  object, and therefore so  dotal'm-
ineu  1ly  something  out of the conscious-
ness. *  Lot me request the reader to  note 
this.  Inhtilion here will be nearly the S!l.me 
as  ,e prclllit30  not  itself  a  conolusion;" 
the only dilfllrcnoe being tqat premises and 
oonolusions are judgments, whereas an in-
tllition  may, as far as its  definition states, 
ho  (LilY  kind  of cognition  whatever.  But 
just  itS  l\ conclllsion (good. or bad) is de-_ 
tcrntined in  the  mind of  the  rea.soner by 
its premiso, so  cognitions not  judgments 
may be determined by  previous cognitions; 
and  I\.  cognition  not  so  determined,  nnd 
therefore determined directly bV  the trans-
''ic  The werd intnitus first occurs as  a tcclmi-
cal  term  in  St.  Anselm's  Monologium.  He 
wished to distinguish between our  knowledge 
of God  amI  our  knowledge  of  finite  things 
(alld, in  tbe next  world, of  God,  (1.180)}  and 
thinking  of  the saying of St.  Paul,  VldclIlUS 
nunc pm' speculum ill U3nigmate:  tunc  autef!t facie 
ad./ilcieJII., he  c!l.lled  th~ former :pectl.iatlOn,  an~ 
the latter inttdtton.  TillS use of  speeulatlOn 
did not take root,  because that word  already 
had nllother exact I\lld widely different meltn· 
ing.  In the middle  ages, the term" intuitive 
(lognition" had two  principal senses,  1st,  as 
opposed to a.bstraetive cognition, it meant  tll.e 
-knowledge of the present as present,  an~ tlll.s 
is its lueaninO' in Anselm; but 2d, as  no lOtUl-
tive  cognitio~ was  a.llowed  to  be  determined 
by a  previous co~nitio~, it cam~  ~o be used ~s 
the opposite of dlscurSlve  cogmtlOn  (see Sc?-
tUB, In "entent.  lib. 2,. dist. ~, quo  9), and  tl~lS 
is  nmLrly  the  sense  III  Willcl~  I  e~ploy It. 
This is also  nea.rly the sense m  winch Kant 
uses it the forlner distinction being expressed 
by his 'sensuous and non·senSuouS.  (See Werke, 
herausg.  l~osenkrantz, Thl. .2, S. 713, 31,41, 
100, u. S. w.)  An  enumeratIon. of SIX  :neat;-
ings of intuition may be found m  HamIlton s 
Iteid, p. 769. 
cendental object, is to he termed an intui-
tion. 
Now, it is  pI  Il.i nly one  thing to hnve an 
intuition  anti  nnother to know  intuitively 
that it  is  ILU  intuition, and  the question is 
whether  these  two  things,  distinguislHlhle 
in thought, !l.1'e,  in  fact,  invllrinbly  con-
neeted, so  that we ean  always intuitively 
distinguish between an intuition and a cog-
nition determined by another.  Every cog-
nition, [LS something present, is, of cour8e, 
an  intuition of  itself.  But  the  determ-
ination  of  a  cognition. by another cogni-
tion or  by a.  tmnscendentnl  object is not, 
a.t  least  so  far  as  appears  obviously  at 
nrst, a.  part of the  im mediate  content  of 
that  cognition, although  it  would  appear 
to be an element of.  the  action or plt~,;ion 
of  the  transcendental  ego,  which  i8  not, 
perhaps,  in  consciousness  iIlllUcditltely; 
and yet this transcendental action  or pas-
sion may invariably determine  n.  uo;;nition 
of itself,  so  thflt, in  fact, the  detel'luiIm-
tion or non-determination of the co::\nition 
by another may be a part of the cogniti{)n. 
In  this case, 1  should an.y that Wi!  hlLd  an 
intuitive power of distingui.:;hing au intu-
ition from another cognition. 
There is  no evidence that we  have tid" 
ft1Clt!tV  excent  thttt  we seem  to Jled thtlt  _  ,  t' 
we htwe it.  But the weight  of that  teBti-
mony depends  entirely on  our heing  SIIP-
posed to have the power of distiu;;lIishing 
in this  feeling whether the feelin;;  he the 
result of  education, old  association;;, etc., 
or whether it is  an intuitive cognition;  or, 
in other worus, it depends on pretiuPI\(Hing 
the very mattcr testified to.  Is  thi~  f.~eliug 
infallible?  And is this judgment concern-
hi<" it infallible, and  80 on, ad  illjinilum? 
SI~pp08ing;  that  a  roan  reltUy  could  "hut 
hiIUself up  in such a r  .. \.ith, be would he, of 
course, impervious to the truth," udJellce-
proof."  . 
But lct  us eompn.re the theory WIth the 
historic facts.  The power  of intuitively 
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nitions  has not prevented  men  from  dis-
puting vory wn.rmly ns to which  cogn itions 
are intuitive.  In  the middle  agos, ron  son 
and  extornal  I\uthority  were  l'egnrded  us 
"two coordinate sonrces of knowledge, just 
as  reltSOn  and  the  lluthority  of intuition 
are now; only the happy device of  consid-
ering  the en unci ations  of  nut.bority to be 
essentially indemonstrnble  had  not  yet 
oeen hit  upon.  All authorities were  not 
considered as infallible, any more tban all 
reasons; but when  Bel'engltrius said that 
the authoritativeness of any pUl'ticular I1U-
thority lUU1;t rest upon reason} the proposi-
tion was sconted  as  opinionated, impious, 
and  ahsmd.  Th us, the  credibility of au-
thority was regarded by men  of that time 
simply  us an  ultimate premise, as a  cogni-
tion not determined by a  previous  cogni-
tion of the same object, or~ in our tm'ms, as 
an intuition.  It is strange that they should 
have th<)ught  so, if, as the theory nc»v un-
der  (liflCllSsion  supposes, by merely  eon-
templtlting the credibility of the authority, 
as 11  Fakir  doe!; his  God, they  could have 
seen that it  was not an  ultimate  premise! 
Now, wlmt if our internal authority should 
meet tho same fate, in the history of opin-
ions, as  that external autb ority  has  lUeL? 
C:'-.n  that  be said to  be  absolutely cert!1in 
which  many  sane,  well-infOl'med,  and 
thoughtful men already doubt 2* 
Every  lawyer knows  how  difficult  it is 
'"'  The propoRition  of  Berengn.rius  is  con· 
taincd in the following  quotn.tion from  his  De 
Sacra Cwmz:  "lVlaximi plane  cordis est, per Dm-
nia ad  di,decticam  cDnfugm'e, qltia  cOlljugel'e  ad 
eatn ad ration€ln  est  cO??iugere,  quo q1ti  nOn confu-
tlil, cum secundum l'ationmn sit jacl1ls ad imaf}i1U!ill 
dei, SlllllI!  ll.01lorem reliquil, nee  polest rellDvari  de 
die  in diem ad imaginem de;'''  The most strik-
ing characteristic of  medieval  reasoning. in 
general, is  the  perpetual  resort to  authority. 
vVhen l?redigislls and others wish to prove lhnt 
d:trkness is  a  thing, although  they have  evi-
dently derived the opinion  from  nominalistic-
PhLtonist.ic meditations, they argue  the matter 
thus: "God called the darkness, night;" then, 
certn.inly, it is a  thing, for otherwise  before it. 
had  a Dame, there would  Illtve  heen nothing, 
not even a  fiction  to  name.  Abelard  thinks 
it  worth  while  to  eite  Boethius,  ,~hen  he 
says  that  space  has  three  dimensions,  and 
when he says that a.n  individual cannot be in 
two places at once.  The author of De Gene1'i-
bus et Spflciebus, a work of a superior  order, in 
arguing against a  Platonic  doctl'i.ne, says  that 
if whn.tever is  universal is  eternal, the form 
and  matter of  Socrates, being  sevel'ally  uni-
for  witnesses to distinguish  between what 
they have seen and what they have infel'1'ed. 
~'his is  pal'ticularly noticeable in the ease 
of a person who is describing the p61'-form-
!l.ncl'S of a  spiritual medium or of  a  pro-
fessed  jugglet·.  The  difficulty is  so great 
that t.he juggler himself is often astonished 
at. the discrepancy between the actua.l facts 
and tho stat.ement of an intelligent witness 
who has not understood thc trick.  A  parI; 
. of the  very eomplicated trick of the  Chi-
nese  :tings  consists in  taking  two  solid 
rings linked together, talking about them 
fiS though they were separate-taking it  for 
granted, as it were-then pretending to put 
them togetber, and banding them immedi-
ately to the spectator that he may Bee that 
tbey are solid.  'rhe art of this consists in 
raising, at first> the  strong suspicion  that 
one is  broken.  I havc aecn McAlister  do 
this with such  success, that a  person  sit-
ting  close  to  him,  with  all  his ftwulties 
straining to detect the illusion,would have 
been reltdy to swear  that he saw the  rings 
put together, and', perhnps, if the  j"ug:;!er 
had  not  professedly  practised  ueception, 
would have considered  a  doubt of it  as  a 
doul>t of his own veracity.  'i'bis certninly 
seems to show thn.t iUs not always very eal~y 
to distingUish between a prcmise (tnd a con-
clusion' that  we hlLve  no infa.llible power. 
of doing 80, and that  in fact our  only se-
CUl'ity  in difficult  cases  is  in  some  signa 
versal,  are  both eternal, and  that, therefore. 
Socrates wn.s  not ereated by God, but only PItt 
together, "quod  quantum. a  Ve1"O deviet,palam cst." 
The  authority is  the  nnn.l  court  of  appeal. 
The sn.me author, where in one place he doubts 
a  statement  of Boethius, finds  it necessary to 
assign a.  special reason  wlJy in this  cu·se  it is 
not absurd to do so.  Ea:ceptio prolJat regulam in 
casibus  non  exceptis.  H.ecognized  authorities 
were  certainly  sometimes  disputed  in  the 
twelfth  century; their mutual  contradictions 
insured  that;  and  the  authority or  philoso-
phers was regarded a.s  infedor to thnt of the-
ologians,  Still, it would  be impossible to find 
a passage  where the authority of Aristotle is 
directly  denied  upon  any  logical  question. 
"Sunt et multi errores eiltS," says John of I:'illlis-
bu  ry, "qui in SCl'lpturis tam Ellmici!;, qllamfidelibu  8 
poienmt illt'enil'i:  verllm  in lOfJ1'ca  parem habuisse 
non legitlt1"."  "Sed nihil adversus  .!iris/Dlelem" 
says Abelard, and in another place, "Sed si A,,[s-
totclem  Peripa1etieoT1l1n  principem  culpare  P08Slt-
mlt.~, quam amplius in hac arte recepi!lllts?"  The 
idea of going without an authority, or of sub-
ordinating authority to reason, does  not occur 
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fl'om which we en.n infer thnt a  given  fnct 
must have been seen or must hltve been in-
ferred.  In trying to give  an  account of  a 
dream,  every  accurate person  must  often 
huse felt that it was a hopeless undertILkillg 
to at.tempt to disentangle waking interpre-
tntions and fillings out frem the frngment-
ary images of  the dream itself. 
'fbe mention of dreams suggests another 
argument.  A dream, us f>tr as its own cen-
tent goes, is exactly like an .actual experi-
ence.  It is mistaken for one.  And yet ILll 
the wodd believes that dl'eams are determ-
ined, according to the laws of the associa-
tion of ideas, &c., by previous cognitions. 
If it be said that the faculty of in tuitively 
recoguizing  intuitions  is  asleep,  I  reply 
that  this  is  It  mere  supposition,  without 
a ther  support.  Bcsides,  even  when  we 
wake up, we do not find that the dream dif-
fered from reality, except by certain l1W1'ks, 
d£1rkness and fragmentn,riness.  Not unfre-
qllcntly a  dren.m  is .so vivid that the mem-
ory of it is mistaken for the memory of an 
actual occurrence. 
A  child has, as  far as  we know, all the 
perceptive powers of a man.  Yet question 
him a  little as to how  he knows what he 
does.  In lllany cuses, he will tell you. that 
he never lmll'ned his mother-tongue; be al-
ways knew it, or he knew it as  Boon  as he 
came to have sense.  It appears, then, that 
he does not possess the faculty  of  distin-
guishing,  by  simple  contempl:1tion,  be-
tween an intuition nnd a  cognition determ-
ined by others. 
There  can  be  no  doubt that before the 
publication of Berkeley'S book on Vision, 
it had generally been believed thRl the third 
dimension of spacc was immediately  intu-
ited, although, at present, nearly all admit 
that it is known  by inference.  lYe  had 
been  contemplating  the  object  since  the 
very creation  of mILn,  but this  discovery 
was  not  ma.de  until  we  began  to reason 
about it. 
Does the reader know of  the blind spot 
on the retina?  Take a number of this jour-
nal, turn over tbe cover so as to expose the 
white paper, lay it  Sideways upon the table 
before  whieh  you  must sit,  and  put two 
cents UpOil it, one neal' the left hand edge, 
und the other to the right.  Put your  left 
hand over your left cye, an d with the rig11t 
eye  look  steadily  at  the  left  hnnd  cent. 
Then, with your 1'ight hand, move the right 
hand cent (which  is  now plainly scen) to-
wards the left hand.  vVhen it comes  to It 
place near  the middle of  the  page it will 
disappear-you cannot sec it without turn-
ing your eye.  Bring it nearer to th e other 
cent, or carry it further  away, and it will 
reappear; but at that particular spot it can-
not be seen.  Thus it appears that there is 
a blind spot nearly in the middle of the re-
tin  It ;  and this is confirmed by anatomy  _  It 
follows that the  apnea we immediately see 
(when one eye'is closed) is not., as we bad 
ima.e;ined, a continuous oval, but is a  ring, 
the filling up of which must be the work of 
the intellect.  What more striking exnmple 
could  be desired  of  the  impossibili~y  of 
distinguillhing intellectual results from in-
tuitional datfL, by mere contemplation ~ 
A  man can distinguish different textures 
of cloth by feeling; but not immediately, 
for he requires to move his fingers over the 
cloth,  which  shows that he is  obliged to 
compare the sensations of one instant with 
those of another. 
The 'Pitch  of  a  tODe  depends  upon  the 
rapidity of the succession of the vibrations 
which reach the ear.  Each of those vibra-
tions produces  an impulse  upon the  ear. 
Let a  single such impulse be made upon the 
ear, and we know, experimentally, thnt it  is 
perceived.  There  is, therefore, good rea-
son  to  believe that  each  of  the  impulses 
forming a  tone is perceived.  Nor is there 
any reason to the contrary.  So that tllis is 
the  only  admissible  supposition,  'fhere-
fore, the 'Pitch or  a  tone depends upon the 
rapidity with wbleh certain impressions Ill'e 
successively conveyed to the mind.  Thcse 
impressions  must  exist previously to  any 
tone; henca, the sansation of pitch is de-
termined by previous cognitions.  Never-
theless, this would never have been discov-' 
ered  by  the  mere  contemplation  of  that 
feeling. 
A  similar  argument  may  be  urged  in 
reference to the perception of  two dimen-
sions of space.  '1'hi8 appears to be an im-
mediate intuition.  But if we  were to see 
immediately an extended  surface, our re-
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surface.  Instead  of that, the retina con-
sists of innumerable needles  pointing to-
wards the light, and whose distances from 
one another are decidedly greater than the 
minimum visibile.  Suppose each of those 
nerve-pOints  conveys  the  sensation  of  a 
little colored  surfnce.  Still, what we im-
mediately  see  must even then be, not  a 
continuous  surfaoe,  but  a  oolleotion  of 
spots.  Who could discover this by mere in-
tuition?  But all the analogies of the nervous 
system  ILre  against  the  supposition  that 
the excitation of  a  single nerve can  pro-
duce an idea as complicated  as that of  a 
space, however small.  If  the excitation of 
no one of these nerve  points can immedi-
. ately  convey the impression  of space, the 
excitation  of  all eannot  do so.  For, the 
excitation  of each produces some impres-
sion,  (Mlcording  to  the analogies  of  the 
nervous  system,)  hence~ the sum  of these 
impressions  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
any perception produced 1)y the excitation 
of  all;  or, in  other terms,  a  perception 
produced by the excitation or all is determ-
ined by the mental impressions produced 
by the  excitation  of everyone.  This  ar-
gument is  confiL'med  by the fact  that the 
existence of  the perception  of space can 
be fully accounted for by the action of fac-
ulties known to exist, without supposing it 
to be an immediate impression.  For this 
purpose, we must bear in mind the follow-
ing  facts  of  physio-psychology:  1.  The 
excitation of a nerve does not of itself in-
form us where the extremity of it is situ-
ated.  If, by a  surgical  operation, certain 
nerves are  displaoed, our  sensntions from 
"  those nerves  do not inform  U8 of the  dis-
k  . placement.  2.  A· single sensation does not  g. 
,~  inrorm us how many nerves 01' nerve-points 
are  exoited.  3.  'lYe  can  distinguish  be-
l  tween the impressions produced by the ex-
tu"  eitations of different nerve-points.  4. The 
eel' differences of impressions produced by  dif~ 
hw f  t  't'  f  - 'I  - D'·  eren  exCl  atlons  0  SImI al'  nerve-pOInts 
are  similar.  Let  [I.  momentary image  be 
made upon the  retina.  By No.2, the im-
pression thereby produced  will  be  indis-
tinguishable from what migllt be produced 
by the excitation of some conceivable sin-
gle nerve.  It  is  not conceivable  that the 
momentary  excitation  of  a  single  nerve 
should give the sensation of spaee.  There-
fore,  the  momentnry excitation of all the 
nerve-points of the retina cannot, immedi-
at  ely or  mediately, produce  the  sensntion 
of  space.  The same urgumen  t  woulrl  ap-
ply (0 any unchanging image on the retina. 
Suppose,  however, that  the  imnge moves 
over the retina.  Then  the  peculittr  exci-
tation which  at  one  ins  tan  t  affects one 
nerve-point. at a  later instant will  affect 
another.  These  will  convey  impressions 
which are very similar by 4, and yet which 
o,re  distinguishable by 3.  Hence, the con-
ditions for  the recognition  of  a  relation 
between  these  impressions  are  present. 
'I'here  being, however, a  very great num-
ber of nerve-points affected by a  very great 
number of successive excitations, the rela-
tions of the resulting impl'essioDB  will  be 
almost  inconceivably  complica~ed.  Now, 
it  is a known law of mind, that when phe-
nomena of  an extreme complexi~y are pi·e-
sented. which yet  would  be  l'edueed  to 
order or medio.te simplicity by tbe applica-
tion of a  certain conception, that  concep-
tion soouer 01' later arises in application to 
those phenomena.  In the ease under con-
sideration,  the  conception  of  extension 
would reduce the phenomena to unity, and" 
therefore,  its  genesis  is  fully  accounted 
for.  It  remains  only to  expl.ain  why the 
previous cognitions which determine it are 
not  more  clearly  apprehended.  For this 
explanation, I  shall refer to a  paper  upon 
a  new list of categories, § 5~ * merely add-
ing  that just as we  are  able  to recognize 
our  friends  by  cert!tin  appearances,  al~ 
though we cannot possibly say what  those 
appearances are and are quite unconscious 
of any process of reasoning, s a in any case 
when the re!1soning  is easy and  natural to 
us, however  complex may be tb  e premises, 
they sink into  insignificanoe  and  oblivion 
propori;ionately  to  the satIsfactoriness of 
the theOl'y bused upon them.  This  theory 
of space is  confirmed by the  ciroumstance 
that  an  exactly similar  theory is impera-
tively demanded  by the facts  in  reference 
to  time.  That the  course  of time should 
be immediately felt is  obviously impoBsi-
* Proceedings  of the  American  Academy, 
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ble.  For, in that  case, there  must be  an 
element  of  this  feeling  at each instant. 
:But iu an instant there is no duration and 
hence  no  immediate feeling  of duration. 
Hence, no one of these elementary feelings 
is an immediate feeling of  duration;  and, 
hence the sum of all is not.  On the other 
hand, the impressions  of  any nlOment are 
very complicatcd,-containing all  the im-
ages  (or  the  elements  of the  image!:!)  of 
sense  and  memory,  which  oomplexity is 
reducible to mediate simplicity by means 
of the conception of time.'*' 
We have, therefore,  a  vRriety  of facts, 
aU of which are most readily explained on 
the supposition that we Lave no intuitive 
:faoulty of  distinguishing  intuitive from 
mediate cognitions.  Some  arbitrary hy-
pothesis may otherwise explain anyone of 
these f,tcts;  this  is the only theory which 
brings them to support one anothel'.  More-
'*'  The above theory of space and time does 
not conflict  with  that of Kant so  milch as it 
appears to do.  They are in fact the  solutions 
of different questions.  Kant, it is true, makes 
space and  time intuitions, or rather forms of 
intuition, but it  is  not essential to his  theory 
that intuition should mean more  than "indi-
vidual representation."  The apprehension of 
space and time results, according to him, from. 
a  mental proceas,-the "Synthesis der Appre-
hension in  del' Anschauung."  (See  Critik d, 
reinen Vernunft. Ed. 1781, pp. 98 el  seq.)  My 
theory is  merely an  account  of this  synthe-
sis. 
'rhe gist of Kant's Transcendental1Esthetic 
is contained in two principles.  First, that uni-
versal and necessary propositions are not given 
in experience.  Second, that universal  and ne-
cessary facts arc determined by the conditions 
of  experience in general.  By  a  universal 
proposition is meant merely, one which asserts 
something of all of a  sphere,-not necessarily 
one  which  all  men believe.  By a  necessary 
proposition, is meant one which asserts what it 
does,  not  merely  of the  actual  condition of 
things, but of every possible  state  of  things; 
it is not meant that the  proposition is one which 
we  caunot  help  believing.  Experience,  in 
ICant's  fit'st  principle,  cannot  be  used  for  a 
product of  the  objective understanding,  but 
must be taken for the first impressions of sense 
with consciousness  conjoined and  worked up 
by the imagination into images, together with 
all which is logically deducible therefrom.  In 
this sense, it may be admitted  that  universal 
and necessary propositions are not given in ex-
perience.  But, in  that case,  neither  are  any 
inductive conclusions  which might be  drawn 
from experience, gi  ven in it.  In fact, it is the 
peculiar function of induction to  produce uni-
versal  and  necessary  propositions.  Kant 
points  ont,  indeed,  that the universality and 
over, no facts require the supposition of the 
faculty in question.  Whoever has  studied 
the natnre of pl'oof will see, then. that thel'c 
are here very strong reasons for dlsbeliev" 
ing  the  existence  of  this  faculty.  These 
will become still stronger when the conse-
quences of rejecting it have, in this paper 
and in  a  following  one, been more fully 
traced out.  . 
QUESTION 2.  Whether we have an intui-
tive self-consciousness. 
Self-consciousness, as  the term is here 
used, is to be distinguished both from con-
sciousness  generally,  from  the  intern al 
sense,  and from pure apperception.  .Any 
cognition is a  (lonsciousness of  the object 
as  represented i  by  self-consciousness  is 
meant  It  knowledge  of ourselves.  Not  a 
mere  feeling  of  subjective  conditions  of 
conSCiousness, but  of our personal sehes. 
necessity  of scientific inductions are but the 
analogues  of philosophic  universality and  ne-
cessity;  and  this  is  true, 'In  Sf)  fat·  as  it is 
never  allowable  to  accept a  scientific conclu-
sion  without a  certain  indefinite  drawback. 
But this  is  owing to the insufficiency in the 
number of  the  instances;  and  whenevcr in-
stances may he had in as large nllmbBrs  as we 
please, ad  tl!/init!t1i!, :a truly universal and ne-
cessary  proposition  is  inferable.  As  for 
Kant's sfll!Ond  principle, that the truth of uni-
versal and nece6sary propositions is depf'ndcnt 
upon the conditions of the general experience, 
it  is no more nor less than the principle of In-
dnction.  I  go  to  :a fair  and  draw  from  the 
"  grab-bag" twelve  packages.  Upon  opening 
them, I  find that everyone contains a red ball. 
Here is a universal  fact.  It depends, then, on 
the condition of the experience.  \Vhat  is the 
condition of the experience  ~  It is solely tllRt 
the balls· are the  contents  of packages  drawn 
from that bag, that is, the  only thing  which 
determined  the  experience,  was  the drawing 
from the bag.  I  infer, then, according  to the 
principle of Kant, that what is drawn from the 
bag will contain a red ball.  'rhis is induction. 
Apply induction not to any limited experience 
but to  all human experience and you have the 
Kantian philosophy, so far as it is corrently de-
veloped. 
Kant's  successors, however, ha.ve not been 
content with his doctrine.  Nor ought they to 
have been.  For, there is this third principle: 
"  Absolutely universa.l propositions must be an-
alytic."  For whatever is absolutely universal 
is devoid of all  content or  determination, for 
all determination  is by negation.  The  prob-
lem, therefore,  is  not  ho\v  universal  proposi-
tions  can  be  synthetical,  but how universal 
propositions appearing to be synthetical can ~e 
evolved  by thought alone from the purely m-
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Pure appercertion  is  thesclf-fissertion of 
TIlE ego; tho self-consciousness here meant 
is  the n,eognition  of my private self.  I 
know tlm&  I  (not merely the I) exist.  'I'he 
question is, how do I know it; by n.  special 
intuitive  faculty, or  is it dHtcrmined  by 
previuus cognitions? 
Now, it is not ;;elf-evident that we have  •  sucu  an  intuitive faculty, for  H  has just 
heen shown that we have no intuitive power 
of distinguishing all intuition from  It cog-
nition  determined by  others.  'l'herefore, 
the existence or non-existence of this pow-
er ill to be detcrmined llpon evidence, and 
the qUCfition is w'bethcr self-consciousness 
ettn be explained by  the action  of known 
faculties under conditions known to  exist, 
or whether it is  necessary to  suppose an 
unknown caune for  this  cognition, and, in 
the lntter case, whether an intuitive faculty 
of self-conscionsness is the most probable 
cause which ean be supposed. 
It is first to be observed that there is no 
known self-eonsciousness  to be accounted 
for in extremely young  children.  It has 
already been  pointed  out  by Kant*  thftt 
the lilte use of the very common word" I" 
with children  indictttes an imperfect self-
cOllsciommess in them, and that, therefore, 
BU  fILl'  as  it is admissible fur us  to drlLW 
any conclusion  in regard  to  the  mental 
sttlte of those who are still younger, it must 
1)0  against  the  existence of any self-coll-
sciou~lIess ill them. 
On  tht;  other  hand,  children  manifest 
power~ of thought much earlier.  Indeed, 
it is almost  impossible  to  assign it period 
at which  children  do  not  already exhibit 
decided intellectual activity iu  directions 
in  which thought is indiljpensable to their 
welI-being.  'rhe complicated trigonometry 
of yjsion, a11.1  the  delicate  adjustmen ts of ' 
cQordinated  movement,  are  plainly  mas-
tered  very early.  There  is  no rellson  to 
question  it similar  degree  of  thought  in 
reference to themselves. 
A  very YOUllP;  child  lllay always  be  ob-
seryed to watch its own body with grflat at-
tention.  There is every reason  why this 
should be so, for from the child's point oj' 
view this body is the most importan t  thing 
* iVerke, vii. (2), 11. 
in the universe.  Only what it touches Ims 
any netualand present feeling ;  only what 
it f!Lees  h[1S  any nCLunJ color i  only what is 
on its tongue haa auy actLHll  t!Late. 
No one questions  th[1t, when  a  sound is 
heard by a  child, he thinks, not of himself 
as hearing, but of the bell or other object 
as sounding.  How when he wills  to move 
It table?  Does  he  then think  of himself 
as deSiring, or only of the table as fit to be 
moved?  '1'httt  he  has the latter thought, 
is  beyond  question;  that he  has the  for-
mer, lUust, until the existence of  an intui-
tive  self-consciousness  is  proved,  remain 
an  arbitrary  and  baseless  supposition. 
'l'hero  is no good  reason for thinking that 
he is less ignorant of his own peculiar con-
dition  than the  angry  adult who  denies 
thtLI; he is ill 11  passion. 
~rhe child, however, must soon discover 
by observation tht.t  things which  are thus 
fit to  be changed  Rl'e  apt actually to  un-
dergo  this  change,  after  a  contllct  with 
that  peculiarly  important  body  called 
'Willy or Johnny. This consideration makes 
this body still more important and centraJ~ 
since  it establishes  It  connection between 
the fitness  of a  thing to  be changed  ftnd 
It tendency in this  body to touch it before 
it is  changed. 
The chihl  leitrns  to understand  the lan-
guage; that is to say, a connecHon between 
certain sound"  and  certain facts  becomes 
estahl ished  in  his  mind.  He has  preyi-
ously  ~oticed the connection between these 
Bounds and the motions of the lips of hod-
ies  somewhat  similar to the  eentral  one  .  , 
and  has  tried  the  experiment  of  putting 
his hand  on  thos,1)  lips  and has found  the 
sound  in that case  to be  smothered.  He 
thus  connects that  language  with  hodies 
somewhat similar  to the  central  one.  By 
effurts, so unenergetiu that they should  be 
oalled  rather  instinctive,  pel'bn.l)s  th  Iln  .  , 
tentative,  he  learns  to  produce  thoas 
Bounds.  So he begins to conVe1·se. 
Il; must be about  this  time that he  be-
gins to find  that what these ppople about 
him say is the  very best evidence of fact. 
So  lUuch  so,  thl1ttestimony  is' even  a 
stronger mark of fact thu,n the facts them-
selves,  Or  rather  thnn what must now  be 
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(I  may remark, by  the  way, tha.t  this l"e-
mains so through lifo;  testimony will con-
vince a  man that  he himself'i" mad.)  A 
child hears  it said  that the stove  is  hot. 
But it is  not,  he  says; and, indeed, that 
contral body is not tOllching  it, and  only 
what thfLt  touchos  is hot or cold.  But he 
touches  it,  [tud  finds  the  testimony con-
firmed ill  a  striki n"'"  way'.  'rhus  he  he- e"  , 
comes aware  of  ignOl"anCe,  and it is  ne-
Dossn,TY  to  6ul,pose  a  self  in  which this 
ignorance oan in  h e~re.  So tetltirnony ~gh'es 
the first dawning of self-conseiousness. 
But, further,  altllough  usually  appear-
ances are  eithel'  only confirmed or ID!'rely 
supplemented  by testimony, yet there is a 
oertain  remarkablo  Ch1SS  of  appc:u'unces 
which are continually contmdicted by tes-
timony.  These tl.re those predicates which 
we know to be emo tiolll11, but which he tlis-
tinguishes  by  their  connection with  the 
movements  of  that  oentral  pcrson,  him-
self, (that  the  table wants moving, etc.) 
'l'heso judgments are gencrally denied  by 
others.  Moreover~ he has  reason to think 
thn,t  others,  also,  hn.ve  such  judgrnenlS 
wh  ieh  me  quite  denieu  by  all  the  rest. 
Thus, he  adds  to  the  conception  of  up-
PB(t1'a,llce as  thB  !l.ctualizlltion  of fuct, the 
conception of it as something  private llnd 
valid  only for one body.  In short, error 
appears, and  it  can be  exph.inod only  by 
s apposing  a self -which is fllllible. 
Ignorance and  error are aJl that distin-
guish our private  selves from the absolute 
ego of pure apperception. 
Now, the  theory which, for the sake of 
perspiouity, has thns been stated in a spe-
cific form, ml1.y be summed up IlS  follows: 
At the  no-c at wh  ich we know  ehild1"en  to  o  . 
be Belf-conscious~ we know that they hR.ve 
been made aware of ignorance and  error; 
and we know  them to possess nt that age 
powel's of understanding sufficient to ena-
ble them them to infer from ignorance and 
errOl'  their own  existence.  Thus  we find 
that known faculties, acting  undel' condi-
tions  know.n  to  oxist, would  rise to  self-
consciousness.  The  only essential  defect 
in this account of the m.atter is, that while 
we know that ch  ildren  exercise  as  much 
understanding as  is here  supposed, we  do 
not know that they exercise it in preoisely 
this way.  Still the supposition  tlHlt  they 
do so is infinitely more supported by facto, 
than  the  supposition of a  wholly pe!;ulinr 
fllculty of the mind. 
The  only argument  worth  notiCing  fur 
the existence of an intuitive self-cuIlHdous-
ness is this.  'Ve are  more  ccrtain of uur 
own  existence  than  of any  othllr  flict;  a 
premise cannot determine a conclusion  to 
1)0  more  certain than it is  itself; hence, 
our own  existence  cunnot  havc  bl'en  in-
ferred from any other fact.  The first prcm-
ise  must  be  admitted,  but  the  seconu 
premise is founded on an exploded  theory 
of logic.  A  conclusion  cannot  he  more 
certain  than  that  some  one  of the  fucts 
which support it is true, but it mlty et!Hily 
be  more  certain  than  anyone of  dlOHO 
facts.  Let us suppose, for example, that. It 
dozen  witncsses  testify to an  occurrence. 
Then  my belief  in that  occurrence rests 
on  the belief that  each  of  those  men  is 
generally to be believed upon oath.  Yet the 
fact testified to is made more  certain dum 
that anyone of  those  men is genemlly to 
be believed.  In the same way, to the de-
veloped  mind  of man, his  own  existence 
is  supported by every  olher  fact, itnd  is, 
therefore, incomparably more certain than 
any onc of  these facts.  But it Cilllllot be 
said to be more eerbtin than that  tl!"re  iii 
nnother fact, since there is  no uoubt  }ler· 
ceplible in either C:lse. 
It  is to be concluueu, then, that  there is 
ItO  necessity  of  supposing  llU  intuitive 
self-consciousness, since self·consciousnesB 
lllay ell,sily l}e  the result of infcr!;lwc. 
QUESTIO::O;  3.  rVh ethel' we have lin intui-
tive  power  of dislingnishin.!1  beitL'een  the 
subj  ective  elements  of  different  kinds  of 
cogftitions. 
~very cognition  involves  sonwthill~ re-
presented, 01' that of  which we nre censduus, 
and  some  action  01'  pflssion  of  the  ,;elf 
whereby it becomes represented.  The for-
mer shall be termed  the objective, the lat-
ter the suhjoctive, element of the co;,;nition. 
The cognition  itself is an  intuition ,if its 
objective clement, which  may therefore be 
called,  also,  the  immediate  object.  The 
subj ective elemen  t is not necessarily imme-
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intuition of  the  subjective  element  of a 
cognition of  its ch<l.raoter,  whether  that 
of dreaming,  imagining,  conceiving,  bo-
lieving, etc., should accompany every cog-
nition.  The question is whether this is so. 
lt  would appeal', at  first sight, that there is 
an overwhelming array of evidence in favor 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  power.  The 
differenoe between seeing It color and  im-
agining it is  immense.  There is  a  vast 
differenoe  between  the most  vivid  dream 
and  reality_  And if we had no  intuitive 
power of distinguishing between what we 
believe and what we  merely conceive, we 
never, it  would seem, oould in any way dis-
tinguish them; since if we did so by rea-
soning,the  question  would  arise whether 
the argument  itself was believed or con-
oeived, and  this must be answered before 
the conclusion could have any foroe.  And 
thus there would be  a  regressus  ad infini-
tum.  Besides, if we do not know that we 
believe, then, from the  nature of the case, 
we do not believe. 
But be it noted  that we  do  not intni-
tively know the  existence  of  this  faculty. 
For .it  is an  intuitive  one, and we  cannot. 
intuitively know that a  cognition is intui-
tive.  The question  is, therefore, whether 
if;  is necessary to suppose the existence of 
this faonlty, or whether then the facts can 
be explained without this supposition. 
In the first plaoe, then, the differenoe be-
tween  what  is imagined or dreamed and 
what is  actually experienced, is  no  argu-
ment in  favor  of the  existence of such  a 
faculty.  For  it is  not  questioned  that 
there  are  distinctions  in what is present 
to the  mind, but  the question  is, whether 
independently of any suoh  distinotions  in 
the  immediate  objects  of  oonsciousness, 
we  have  any  immediate power  of distin-
guishing different modes of oonsciousness. 
Now, the  very fact of the  immense differ-
enoe in the immediate objects of sense and 
imrrgination, Bufficiently  accounts  for  our 
distinguishing those f!lcuUies; and instead 
of being nn argument in favor of the  ex-
istence  of an  intuitive  power  of  distin-
guishing  the Bubjective  elements  of oon-
sCiousness, it is  a  powerful  reply  to any 
such argument~ so far as the distinction of 
senSe and imagination is concerned. 
Passing to the  distinction of belief and 
conception, we meet the statement that the 
knowledge of  belief is  essenti!tl to its ex-
istence.  Now~  we can unquestionably dis-
tinguish  a  belief  from  a  conception,  in 
most cases, by means of a peculiar feeling 
of conviction; and it is a  mere  question 
of words whether we definc  belief as that 
judgment  whioh is ,accompanied  by  this 
feeling, or as that judgment from which a 
man will  act.  We may conveniently call 
the formel' sensational, the latter active be-
lief.  That neither  of  these  necessarily 
involves the other, will surely be adm itted 
without  any  recital  of  facts.  Taking 
belief  in  the  sensational  sense,  the 
intuitive  power  of  reorganizing  it will 
amount  simply  to  the  capacity  for  the 
sensation which accompanies the judgment. 
This  sensation, like  any  other, is  an  ob-
ject  of consciousness;  and  therefore  the 
oapacity for it implies no  intuitive recog-
nition of subjective elements of cOllscious,-
ness.  If  belief  is  taken  in  the  active 
Bense, it may be discovercd by the  obaer;' 
vation  of  external facts and by inference 
from  the  sensation  of  conviction  which 
usually  accompanies it. 
Thus, the arguments in favor of this pe-
culiar power of  consciousness  disappe\tr, 
and the presumption is again against such 
a hypothesis.  Moreover, as the immediate 
objects  of any two faculties  must  be  ad-
mitted to be different, the facts do nut ren-
der such a  supposition in any degree  ne-
cessary. 
QUES'J'ION 4.  Whether we have any pow- . 
e1' of  int1'ospection,  or whethE1'  ou-r  whole 
knowledge of the internal world is de-rived 
from the observation of  external facts? 
It is not;  intended  here  to  assume  the 
reality of the external world.  Only, there 
is a  certain  set of facts which are  ordina-
rily rcgarded as external, while  others are 
rega.rded  as  internal.  The  question  is 
whether  the  latter  are  known  othcrwise 
than by inferenoe from the former.  By in-
trospection, I  mean a  direct perception of 
the  internal  world,  but not necessarily a 
peroeption of it all internal.  Nor do I mean 
to  limit  the signification  of the  word  to 
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edge of the internal world not. derived from 
externnl observa.tion. 
Therc is  onc scnsc in which any percep-
tion has  an  internal  object, namely,  that 
every sensation  is  partly  determined  by 
internal conditions.  Thus, the  sensation 
of l'edness is as it is, owing to the  consti~ 
tntion of the mind; and in this sense it is 
a  sensation of something internal.  Hence, 
We may derive  a  knowledge  of  the  mind 
from a consideration of this sensation, but 
that knowledge would, in  fact, be an in-
ference  from  redness  as  !1  predicate  of 
something  external.  On the  other hnnd, 
there are  certain oth or feelings-the emo· 
tiODS, for example-which appear to arise 
jn the first place. not as predicntes  at all, 
and to be referahle to  the mind alone.  It 
would seem, thcn, that by means of these, 
a  knowledge of the mind may he obtained, 
which is not  inferred from  any character 
of  outward  things.  The  question  is 
whether this is renny 80.  . 
Although  introspection is not  necessa~ 
rpy intuitive, it is not self-eviden~ that we 
possess  this capacity; for we have no  in~ 
tuitive  faculty of distinguishing  different 
subjectivc  modes  of  consciousness.  The 
power, if it exists, must be known  by the 
cil·cumst.ance that the fttCts cannot  be ex~ 
plained without it. 
In reference to the ahove argument from 
the emotions, it must  be  admitted that if 
a  man is angry, his  anger implies, in gen-
eral, no determinate an d  constant ebarae~ 
tel' in its object.  But, on the  other hand1 
it ean  hn,rdly be questioned  that there i9 
some  relative  character  in  the  outward 
thing which makes him  angry, and a little 
reflection will serve to show that his anger 
consists  in  his  saying  to  himself,  «this 
thing is vile, abominable, etc  .• "  and that it 
is rather a mark of returning reason to say, 
"I  am angry."  In the same way anyemo-
. tion is a predication concerning some object, 
and the chief difference between this and an 
objective intellectual judgment  is that while 
the latter is relative to human nature or to 
mind in general, the  former is  relative to 
the particular  circumstances and  di8posi~ 
tion  of  a  particular man at a  pnrticular 
time.  What is here  said of emotions  in 
general, is true in particular of the  sense 
of beauty and of the moral  scnse.  Good 
and  bad  are feelings which  first  arise as 
predicates, and  therefore  are either pred-
ieates of the  not-f, or are  determined  by 
previous cognitions (there being no intui-
tive  power  of  distinguishing  subjective 
elements of consciousness). 
It  remains, then, only to inquire whether 
it is  necessltry  to  suppose  a  particular 
power of introspection for the snke of  ac~ 
counting for the  sense of willing.  Now, 
volition,  as  distinguished  from  desire, is 
nothing  but  the  power  of  eoncentrating 
the attention, of  al)Btracting.  lIence, the 
knowledge  of  the power  of  abstracting 
may be inferred from abstrac~ objects, just 
as the  knowledge  of the  power of seeing 
is inferred from colored objects. 
It appears,  thercfore,that  there  hi  no 
reason for supposing !1 power of intl'ospec~ 
tion; and,  consequently, the  only way of 
investigating  a  psychologieal  question  is 
by inference from external facts. 
QUESTION 5.  Whether we can think with-
out  signs. 
This is !\, familiar question, but there is, 
to this day, no better argnment in the  nf~ 
nrmative  than that thought must precede 
every sign.  This  assumes the  impossibil-
ity of  an  infinite series.  But  Achilles. as 
!\,  fact,  will  overtake the tortoise.  How 
this  happens, is a  question not necessary 
to  be  a,nswered  at present,  as  long  as it 
certainly does ho.ppen. 
If we  seek  the light  of  external facts, 
the  only cases  of tbought which  we  can 
find are  of thought  in  signs.  Plainly, no 
other thought can  be evidenced by external 
facta.  But we have seen that only by ex-
ternal facts can  thought be known  o.t  aU. 
The only thought, then, which can possibly 
be  cognized  is  thought  in  signs.  But 
thought which cannot be cognized does not 
exist..  All  thought,  therefore, must ne-
cessarily be in signs. 
A  man  says  to himself, "Aristotle is a 
roan; therefore, he is fallible."  Has he not, 
tben, thought what he has not said to bim~ 
self, tbat all  men  are fallible?  The  an~ 
swer is, that he bas done so, so far  as this 
is  said  in  his  therefore.  According  to 
this, our question does  not relate to fact, 112  Q'ueslions  concerning ce1'tain Faculties claimed for .JI.lan. 
but is  a  mere  asking  for  distin,ctncss  of 
thought. 
From the proposition that every thought 
is  a  sign,  it follows  that  every  thought 
must  address  itself  to  some  other, must 
determine some other, since that is the es-
sence  of a  Sign.  This,  after  all, is  but 
another fornl of the  fnmiliar  axiom, that 
in intuition, i. e. in the immediate present, 
there  is  no  thought, or, that  aU which is 
refiected  upon  has  past.  Hinc  loquor 
inde est.  That, since  any  thought, there 
must have been a thought, has its analogue 
in the fact that, sinoe any past time, there 
must hn,ve been an  infinite series of times. 
To say, therefore, that thought cannot hap-
pen  in an  instant, but rerluires a  time, is 
bUG  another  way  of  saying  that  eVQl'y 
thought must be interpreted in another, or 
that all thought is in signs. 
QUESTION  6.  Whethe'r a  sign can have 
any meaning, if  by its  dtifinilion it is the 
sign of something absolutely incognizable. 
It  would seem that it can, and  that uni-
versal  and  hypothetical  propositions  0.1'0 
instances of it.  Thus, the universal prop-
osition, "all  ruminants nro olaven-hoofed," 
speaks  of a  possible  infinity  of  animals, 
and no  matter  how many ruminants  may 
have  been  examined, the  possibility must 
remain  that thoro are  othors  whioh  have 
not  been examined.  In the case of a hy-
pothetical proposition,  the same  thing is 
stilI more manifest; for such a proposition 
speaks  not  merely of the  aetual  state  of 
things,  but  of  every  possible  state  of 
things, all of which are not  knowable, in-
'lSIlluoh as only oue c:tn so muoh as exist. 
On thc  other  hand,  all our conceptions 
are obtained by abstractions and combina-
tions of cognitions first occurring in judg-
ments  of experience.  Aceordingly~ there 
can  he  no  conception  of the  absolutely 
incognizable,  since  nothing  of  that sort 
occurs  in experience.  But the meaning of 
a  term is  the conception which it conveys. 
Hence, a  term can have nQ  such mea.ning. 
If it be said  that  the in  cognizable is  a  •  concept  compounded  of  the  concept not 
and cognizable, it may be replied that not 
is a mere syncategoreuma.tic term and not 
a  concept by itself. 
If I think" white," I will not  go so  far 
as Berkeley and say that I think of a person 
seeing, but I willsny that what I  think is of 
the nature of a cognition, and  so of any-
thing else which can be experienced.  Oon-
sequently, the  highest  conoept which can 
be reached by abstractions from judgments 
of  experience-and  therefore, the  highest 
concept which  can  be  reached at all-is 
the concept of something of the nt.ture of 
a  cognition.  Not, then> or what  is  other 
than,  if  a concept,  is  a  concept  of  the 
cognizable.  Hence~ not-cognizable, if  a 
concept, is a concept of  the form  "A,  not-
A,"  and  is,  at  least,  self-contrLLdictory. 
Thus, ignorance' and error can only be con-
ceived as cOl'relative to a real know  ledge and 
truth, which latter are of the nature of cog-
nitions.  Over against any cognition, there 
is an unknown but knowable reality;  but 
over against all possible cognition, there is 
only the seH-contradictory.  In short, cog-
nizabilUy (in its widest sense) and being are 
not merely metaphysically  the  same, but 
are synonymous terms. 
To the argument from universal and hy-
pothetical  propositions, the  reply  is, tllll,t 
though their trutll cnnnot be cognized with 
absolute  certainty,  it  mny  be  probably 
known by induction. 
QUESTION  7.  Whether the1<e  is any cog-
nition not £leie1-mined  by a  previous cogni-
tion. 
It would seem that there is or has been; 
for since we are in possession of cognitiollS~ 
which are all determined by previous oncs~ 
and these by cognitions  earlier still, there 
must  !lave  been  a jirst  in this  series  01' 
else our state of cognition  at any time  is 
completely determined, according  to logi-
cal laws, by onr state at any previous time. 
But there are  many facts  agninst the  last 
supposition, and therefore  in favor of in-
tuitive cognitions. 
On the other hand, since it is impOSSible 
to know intuitively that It given  cognition 
is  not determined  hy a  previous  one, the 
only way in which this can be known isby 
hypothetic inference froln observed  facts. 
But to  adduce  the  cognition  by which a 
given cognition has  been determined is to 
explain the determinations  of that  cogni-
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tion.  And it is the  only way of explain-
ing them,  For something entirely out  of 
consciousness which may be supposed to 
determine it, can, as  such, only be known 
and  only adduced in the  determilltLte cog-
nition  in question.  So, that  to  suppose 
that a  cognition  is  determined  solely by 
something absolutely external, is  to  sup-
pose  its  determinations  incapable  of  ex-
planation.  Now, this is a hypothesis whioh 
is warranted  under no  circumstances, in-
asmuch  as  the only  possible justifioation 
for  a  hypothesis  is that  it expl!tins  the 
facts, and to  say that they  are  explained 
and at the same time to suppose  them in-
explicable is self-contradictory. 
If it be objected that the peculiar char-
acter of red is not determined by any pre-
vious cognition, I reply that that character 
is not a  charaoter  of red  as a  cognition; 
for if there be a  man to whom  red  things 
look as blue ones do to me and vice versa, 
that man's eyes teach him the  same faets 
that they would if he were like me. 
Moreover,  we  know  of  no  power  by 
whioh an intuition could be known.  For, 
as the cognition is beginning,  and  there-
fore in a state of change, at  only the first 
instant would it be intuition.  And, there-
fore,  the  apprehension  of  it  must  take 
place in no time and be an event oceupying 
no  time.*  Besides,  all  the  cognitive 
faculties  we  know  of  are  relative,  and 
consequently their products are  relations. 
But the  cognition of a rela.tion is  determ~ 
ined  by  previous  eognitions,  No  cog-
nition  not  determined by a previous  cog-
nition,  then,  can  be  known.  It  does 
not cxist, then, first, because it  is absolute-
ly incognizable,  tmd  seeond,  because  a 
cognition only exists so far as it is known. 
'fhe reply to the argument that there must 
be a first  is  as  follows:  In  retracing our 
way from oonclusions to premises, or from 
determined cognitions to  those  which de-
termine them, we finally reaoh, in all oases, 
a point beyond which the consciousneslI in 
the  determined  oognition  is  more  lively 
than in the oognition whioh determines it. 
* This  argument, llOwever,  only  covers  a 
part of the question,  It does not go to  show 
that there  is  no  cognition  undetermined ex-
cept by another like it, 
S  '. 
We have a less lively oonsciousness  in the 
oognition  which determines  our cognition 
of the  third  dimension  than in the latter 
cognition itself; a less lively oonseiousness 
in  the ()ognitionwhicb determines our cog-
nition of It continuous surfaoe (without  It 
blind spot) than in this latter cognition it-
self;  and a lcslllively consoiousness of the 
impressions whioh determine the sensn.tion 
of tone than of that sensatiou  il;self.  In-
deed, when we get near  enough to the ex-
ternal this is the universal  rule.  Now let 
any horizon.tal line  represent  a oognition, 
and let the length of the line serve to meas-
ure  (so  to  speak)  the  liveliness  of con-
soiousness in that cognition.  A point, hav-
ing  no  length,  will,  on  this  principle, 
represent an object quite out of consoious-
ness.  Let one  horizontal  line  below  nn-
other  represent a oognition whioh- determ-
ines,  the  cognition  represented  by  that 
other and whieb has the same object as the 
lattcr.  Let the finite distance between two 
such lines represent that they are two dif-
ferent eognitions,  With this aid to think-
. ing, let us Ilee  whether "there must be a 
first."  Suppose  an  inverted  trianglo  V 
to be gradually dipped into  W~l.ter.  At any 
(late or instant,  the  surface  of the water 
makes a  horizontal line  across  that trian-
gle.  'fhis line represents a  oognition.  At 
a subsequent date, there is a sectional line 
so made, higher  upon the  triangle.  This 
repl"eSents  another  cognition  of the same 
object determined by the former, and hav-
ing a livelier consciousness.  The apex:  of 
the triangle represents the object external 
to the mind  which  determines  both these 
cognitions.  Til e state  of the triangle be-
fore it  retlohes the Witter, represents a state 
of cognition which oontains nothing which 
determines  these  subsequent  oognitions. 
'fa say, then,  thflt if there be a  stltte  of 
cognition by_ whioh all  subsequent cogni-
tions of a  oertain object flro not determin-
ed, there must subseq  ueutly be  some oog-
nition  of that  object not  det81'mined  by 
previous  cognitions  of the sallle objeot) is 
to say  tha,t when thttt  triangle  is clipped. 
into the water there  must  be  lL sectional 
line made by the surflwe of the water low-
er than which  110  surface  line  had been 
made in thttt way.  But draw the hori:z<on-114  Leiters on Goethe's Faust. 
tal line where  you will, as  many bori2Oon-
tal lines as you please oan  be  assigned at 
finite  distnnoes  below  it  and  below  one 
another.  For any suob  section is at some 
distanoe above the apex, otherwise it is not 
aline.  Let this distanoe be a.  Then there 
have been similar ~ections at tbe distances 
1ia,  !ta,  ta, Toa,  above the apex, and so on 
as far as you please.  So that it is not true 
that there ill  ust be a first.  Explicate tbe log-
ioal  diffioulties  of this  paradox (they  are 
identical with  those  of  the  Acbilles)  in 
whatever way you mlty.  I  am content with 
tbe result, as long  as  your  principles  are 
fully applied to the partionlar case of oog-
nitiuns  detel'mining  one  another.  Deny 
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motion, if it seems  proper  to do so; only 
then deny tbe process of determination of 
one  cognition  by  another.  Say that in-
stants and lines are fictions; only say, also, 
that states of cognition and judgments are 
fictions.  '1.'be point here insisted on is not 
this or that logical solution of the difficul-
ty, but  merely that  cognition  arises by a. 
process of beginning,  as any other change 
comes to paRS. 
In a subsequent paper,  I  sball trace the 
consequences of these principles, in 1'efer-
ence to tbe questions  of  reality,  of indi-
viduality, and of  tbe  validity of  the laws 
of logic. 
ON  FAUST. 
(By H. C. BRO=IEYFR.] 
VI. 
DEAR H.-In  following our theme through 
tbe spbere of manifestation, we ,nrived at 
the  conolusion:  "Altbough  ml1,n  Cltnnot 
know truth-has no Reason-be  does pos-
sess a stomaoh, a  capacity for  sensual en-
joyment and an Understauding to minister 
to  the same-to be  its  servant."  With 
this  oonolusion, we  have  arrived  at  the 
world of Reality,-for we  have  attributed 
objective  validity  to  the Understanding. 
It also  determines  our  position  in  tbat 
world.  The  Undel'standing-Mephisto-
is  our  guide  and  servant;  the  world  of 
Reality a mere means for individual endB-
for private gratificati~n.  'Vhatevel' higher 
pretensions  this  world might  make, suoh 
pretensions  are based upon the presuppo-
sition that man can know Trut.h, and  are 
therefore  without  foundation.  Hence, 
this world of Reality-the F,trnily, Society, 
and  the  State-have  no right and  no au-
thority as against  the  individual  inclina-
tions and  desires of man.  Tbe  latter are 
supreme and  find  their  limitation not in 
Reason but  in  the  power  of, the  Under-
standing  to  supply  them  with  means  of 
gratification.  It is true tbatthese means are 
derived from without, and bence, tbat the 
individual  under  this view is limited  and 
determined from without, and that external 
determination  is  collision  and  conflict. 
Besides,  wblttm-er  our  conviction  with 
reference to the world  of Reality may be, 
that world, once for all, is extant  with the 
bold  claim  of being  on the  one  side  the 
pledge and on the  other the  very embodi-
ment of the rational existenoe of the race; 
and it wields  moreover, in thn,t  existenoe, 
the  power  of  tbe  race.  Bnt this  is  O'1.W 
reflection,  dear  friend,  whioh  it may  be 
well enough  to keep  in view, as  a  species 
of logicll,l heat-ligbtning along the hOrizon, 
but wbich has no  signifiuance  under  the 
conclusion arrived fit  by Faust.  Under it 
our  individual  desires  and  inclinations, 
however capt'icious, are tbe end, and what-
ever presents itself  htls value and validity 
in so far and only in so far as it is a means 
for this end. 
These a.re  the principles of the man be-
fore UB, who, 
"For idle dalliance too old, 
Too young to be without desire," 
is still  professor in a  German University. 
His life falls in the historic period when a 
knowledge  of the  natural sciences is not 
as  yet diffused, and  many  of  the  results 
remain arcana for individual profit.  Pos-